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such an award made by arbitrators pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.
has
The opinion of the Adjustment Board that the union "...
a particular obligation beyond the normal . . ." to respect its con-

tract obligations 2 6 suggests a justification for the imposition of punitive damages in this class of contract violations. The preservation
of economic stability in employer-employee relationships, and the
avoidance of breaches of the peace resulting from labor disputes and
their consequent picketing, strikes and lockouts, is paramount. Therefore it is submitted that reasonable penalty provisions designed to
consideration as a potential
prevent industrial strife should command
27
implementation of public policy.

ARBITRATION-NOT "SUIT"

WITHIN MEANING OF INSURANCE

POLIcYm-Plaintiff company, a subcontractor, agreed to indemnify the
general contractor against any loss during construction, to provide
liability insurance covering such losses, and to settle any claims by
arbitration.' Plaintiff then procured a policy wherein defendantinsurer agreed to defend "....

any suit against the insured alleging

such injury.. ." and to pay after the final determination of liability
"...

by judgment against the insured after actual trial .

. . ."

The

general contractor asserted a claim, but the insurer refused to defend
in the ensuing arbitration, or be bound by the award. Held: arbitration is not a "suit" within the meaning of the policy; and the insurer
is not obligated by any award.2 Madawick Cont. Co. v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 281 App. Div. 754 (2d Dep't 1953).
Arbitration has developed into a widely-employed means of
settling controversy without the time-consuming and costly litigation
inherent in the regular court system.3 No newcomer in the field,
260Opinion of Impartial Chairman, [Record, p. 30].

27 See opinion of Botein, J., Matter of Publishers' Association (Newspaper
Union), 111 N. Y. S. 2d 725, 732 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (Special Term decision in
Newspaper case).
1 This was a standardized contract for agreements between general contractors and subcontractors, prepared by the New York Building Congress.
2 Two justices dissented on the ground that, although the insurer need not
defend in the arbitration, it would be obligated by a judgment on any resulting
award.
3 Cf. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 240 N. Y.
398, 408, 148 N. E. 562, 565 (1925) ; Matter of Friedman, 215 App. Div. 130,
136, 213 N. Y. Supp. 369, 375 (1st Dep't 1926) ; Knickerbocker Textile Corp.
v. Sheila-Lynn, Inc., 172 Misc. 1015, 1018, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 435, 438 (Sup. Ct.
1939); see Mosk, Arbitration Versus Litigation, 7 ARB. J. (x.s.) 218 (1952)
(a judge's viewpoint).
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arbitration has long been accorded the status of a quasi-judicial tribunal, 4 recognized by the established courts as a legitimate and conclusive method of determining facts and issues of law as between the
parties to the contract or submission. 5 The requirement of notice
before hearing,6 the administration of the oath to witnesses, the right
to cross-examine 7 -- all bespeak the judicial nature of the proceeding.,
Recent statutes have added to its dignity by designating arbitration
a "special proceeding," 9 including it within the laws regulating the
established courts, 10 and putting the coercive power of the law behind
the docketed award of the arbitrators.1 The arbitration award is
conclusive, unless it can be vacated on the13grounds specifically defined
by statute 12 or limited by decisional law.
The term "suit" has been defined generally as a "proceeding in
a court of justice." 14 This is not limited, however, to a specific form
or type of action, 15 but includes any proceeding whereby the plaintiff

4 Cf. Atlantic Rayon Corp. v. Goldsmith, 277 App. Div. 554, 10 N. Y. S.
2d 849 (1st Dep't 1950), leave to appeal denied, 302 N. Y. 842, 100 N. E. 2d
40 (1951); Application of Steuben, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 613 (Sup. Ct. 1950);
Produce Refrigerator Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc., 91 Minn. 210,
97 N. W. 875 (1904); see American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. New Jersey Ins.
Co., supra note 3, at 405, 148 N. E. at 564.
5
See Matter of Fletcher, 237 N. Y. 440, 446, 143 N. E. 248, 250 (1924);
Fudickar v. Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 392, 399 (1875); Webster
v. Van Allen, 217 App. Div. 219, 221, 216 N. Y. Supp. 552, 554 (4th Dep't
1926).
6 Cf. Stefano Berizzi Co. v. Krausz, 239 N. Y. 315, 146 N. E. 436 (1925);
Shirely v. Knoblock, 8 Ind. App. 433, 35 N. E. 1028, 1030 (1893); see Puget
Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v. Lake Washington Shipyards, 1 Wash. 2d
401, 96 P. 2d 257, 260 (1939).
7Cf. People v. Board of Supervisors, 15 N. Y. Supp. 748, 750 (Sup. Ct.

1891);
see
8

KELmoR,

ARITRATION

N AcTriox

91 (1941).

See Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v. Lake Washington Shipyards, supra note 6.
9N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1459 ("Arbitration... [in accordance with this
article] . . .shall be deemed a special proceeding .. . ").
10 Cf. Brody v. Owen, 259 App. Div. 720, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 28 (2d Dep't
1940); Matter of Friedman, 215 App. Div. 130, 213 N. Y. Supp. 369 (1st
Dep't 1926) ; Schecter v. Atlas Shirt Co., 86 N. Y. S. 2d 220, 222 (Sup. Ct.
1949); see N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 1456 (Power of Arbitrators).
11 N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 1466 (judgment on award has same force and
effect as judgment in action).
12 See N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 1462 (grounds for motion to vacate award);
Smith v. Cutler, 10 Wend. 589 (N. Y. 1833).
13 See Bennett's Adm'r v. Russell, 34 Mo. 524 (1864) (no vacating for
mere error of judgment, law, or conclusions of fact); Fudickar v. Guardian
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 392 (1875) ; Matter of Friedman, supra note 10;
Everett v. Brown, 120 Misc. 349, 198 N. Y. Supp. 462 (Sup. Ct. 1923);
Forshey v. G. H. & H. R. R., 16 Tex. 516 (1856).
14 "A suit is a proceeding in a court of justice for the enforcement of a
right." Drake v. Gilmore, 52 N. Y. 389, 394 (1873); see Barton v. Reynolds,
81 15
Misc. 15, 18, 142 N. Y. Supp. 895, 897 (Sup. Ct 1913).
See Didier v. Davison, 10 Paige 515, 517 (N. Y. 1844).
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seeks to enforce a right by judicial means. 16 The gist of the idea expressed by the word seems to be a controversy which is determined
in a fair and orderly fashion. 17 It would appear, therefore, that if
a tribunal other than a regularly established court nevertheless determines controversies in an orderly and just fashion, the action before
such tribunal should be denominated a "suit." -1 Arbitration proceedings appear to fall into this category.' 9
In a suit on an insurance policy, the general rule is to construe
the instrument against the party who prepared it. 2° Rather than
adhere to fine distinctions, the interpretation sought is that which
the ordinary person of average intelligence would attach to the words
of the policy were he to buy the insurance. 2' In applying this test,
the subject matter of the policy, its purpose, and the circumstances
surrounding its issuance must be taken into consideration. 22 Evidence
of a trade custom is admissible to explain the intent of the parties; 23
"The modes
16 Cf. Weston v. City Council, 2 Pet. 449, 464 (U. S. 1829).
of proceeding may be various, but if a right is litigated between parties in a
court of justice, the proceeding . . . is a suit." Ibid.; cf. Syracuse Plaster
Co. v. Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp., 169 Misc. 564, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 897 (Sup.
Ct. 1938); Matter of Hayt, 39 Misc. 356, 358, 79 N. Y. Supp. 845, 846 (Sup.
Ct. 1902) (suit includes ". . . every judicial proceeding for the enforcement
of a right .... ") ; see Tilden v. Aitkin, 37 App. Div. 28, 31, 55 N. Y. Supp.
735, 737 (3d Dep't 1899) (suit might include special proceeding).
17 Cf. Barrett v. Consolidated Coal Co., 65 F. Supp. 291 (N. D. Ala. 1946)
(elements of suit: proper complaint, final determination on pleadings);
McWilliams v. Hopkins, 11 F. 2d 793, 795 (S. D. Cal. 1926) ("The only
real limitation is that it must be between persons or parties, with the result
that it settles an issuable dispute, and not have its effect purely in rem. . .
Box v. Straight Bayou Drainage Dist., 121 Miss. 850, 84 So. 3 (1920).
28 Cf. People v. Burke, 141 Misc. 663, 254 N. Y. Supp. 22 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
When proceedings ". . . pass beyond the stage of 'administration and reach the
Id. at
point of requiring judicial determination, then a 'suit' results ......
672, 254 N. Y. Supp. at 33.
19But cf. Its re Red Cross Line, 277 Fed. 853 (S. D. N. Y. 1921) (arbitration not suit since not authorized by Federal statute); Crook v. Chambers,
40 Ala. 239 (1866) (Alabama did not include arbitration under its Judiciary
Law;
2 0 New York does).
See Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 32 F. 2d 451, 452 (6th Cir. 1929);
see Taylor v. United States Cas. Co., 269 N. Y. 360, 199 N. E. 620 (1936).
21 Cf. Dupee v. Travelers Ins. Co., 253 App. Div. 278, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 62
(2d Dep't 1938); see 13 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7384
(1943).
22 Cf. Carl Ingalls, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 137 Cal. App. 741, 31
P. 2d 414 (1934); Shore Bridge Corp. v. New York, 186 Misc. 1005, 61
N. Y. S. 2d 32 (Ct. Cl.), aff'd inem., 271 App. Div. 811, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 921
(4th Dep't 1946); Alterman v. Home Ins. Co., 112 Misc. 445, 183 N. Y. Supp.
62 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
23 Cf. Gumbinsky Bros. Co. v. Smalley, 203 App. Div. 661, 667, 197 N. Y.
Supp. 530, 536 (Ist Dep't 1922), aff'd inein., 235 N. Y. 619, 139 N. E. 758
(1923) (parol admissible where words have peculiar significance under the
circumstances) ; see Oswego Falls P. & P. Co. v. Strecher Lith. Co., 215 N. Y.
98, 109 N. E. 92 (1915); 3 Wn.LIsToN, CoNTRAcTs § 650 (1936) (evidence
of usage admissible to explain or give particular meaning to words of doubtful
as well as clear meaning).
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and any doubt is to be decided in favor of the insured. 24 If the insured was justified in assuming that the usage of his trade25 was
known to the insurer when the policy was issued, then the insurer
will be bound thereby since it had actual or constructive notice of
such usage.2 6 In liability policies, as in other forms of insurance,
compliance with the terms of the policy specifying the risks covered
is a condition precedent to successful suits against the insurer.27
Where such compliance depends upon the meaning of the terms, no
construction should be employed which will serve to defeat the effectiveness of the policy and
recovery by the insured 28 unless no
29
other alternative is available.
In the instant case, the contract between the plaintiff and its
general contractor was of a standard form prepared by the New York
Building Congress, 30 providing for arbitration of all disputes arising
out of or relating to the contract, and for liability insurance to be
obtained by the plaintiff.3 1 In the light of these facts, use of the word
"suit" in the policy was ambiguous; and under the rules of construction outlined above, its meaning should be construed in favor of the
insured. The majority of the court in the Appellate Division, however, chose to ignore this consideration, and held the policy a vain
gesture, and the insurer not obligated either to defend in the arbitration, or to pay any judgment entered on an award.
In the dissenting opinion, the Presiding Justice asserted that the
defendant is obligated to pay ". . . any judgment which may be entered on the arbitration award." The insurance policy referred to
. . judgment against the insured after actual trial." It would
24 Cf. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U. S. 167 (1923);
Bushey & Sons v. American Ins. Co., 237 N. Y. 24, 142 N. E. 340 (1923);
McMartin v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 239 App. Div. 296, 267 N. Y. Supp. 473
(3d Dep't 1933), rezfd on other grounds, 264 N. Y. 220, 190 N. E. 414 (1934).
25 See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 649 (1936)
(usage is habitual practice
among certain classes or in a trade).
26 See 3 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs §§ 656, 661 (1936) (if parties knew or

should have known of the usage they are bound by it).

27 Cf. Mehl v. Patriotic Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. S. 2d 403 (Sup. Ct. 1947);
755 Seventh Ave. Corp. v. Carroll, 266 N. Y. 157, 194 N. E. 69 (1935).
28 Cf. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Buckley & Co., 117 F. 2d 845
(3d Cir. 1941) ; Zeig v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 23 F. 2d 665 (2d
Cir. 1928) (strict terms of policy not followed); Rogers v. .;Etna Ins. Co.,
95 Fed. 103 (2d Cir. 1899) (policy had clause excluding loss due to lack of
ordinary care, but it was disregarded, and the policy enforced).
29 Cf. McMartin v. Fidelity & Gas. Co., 239 App. Div. 296, 267 N. Y. Supp.
473 (3d Dep't 1933), rev'd on, other grounds, 264 N. Y. 220, 190 N. E. 414
(1934); see 13 APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRACTIcE § 7386 (1943)
("Results harmful to the insured and of no rational advantage to the insurer
should be reached only when the terms of the insurance policy permit no other

result.").
30

See Madawick Cont. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 App. Div. 754, 755

(2d Dep't 1953)

(dissenting opinion).

32 See Madawick Cont. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 202 Misc. 411, 114 N. Y. S.

2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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seem, therefore, that the arbitration proceeding has achieved recognition, at least in the eyes of the learned dissenting justices, as an
"actual trial." 32 Such a conclusion is entirely sound, and accords
with both the nature of the arbitration proceeding and with the rules
of construction for the interpretation of insurance policies.

A
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

-

MEASURE OF DAMAGES WHERE

INFRINGER'S PROFIT SHOWN.-Plaintlff sued under a subdivision of
the damage section of the Copyright Act 1 for his actual loss and the
infringer's profits, or, in the alternative, statutory damages. The

appellate court 2 found that the copyright owner had suffered damage
due to the infringement, but could not prove his actual injury; and
that the infringing party, Woolworth Company, had realized a profit
of $899.16. Based upon this evidence, the court awarded the maximum statutory damages pursuant to the "in lieu" provision of the
Act. The infringer appealed, asserting that the proof of actual profits
precluded the court from resorting to the statutory award. The
Supreme Court held that since the owner could not prove its actual
damage, statutory damages could be awarded even though actual
profits were proven. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc.,
73 Sup. Ct. 222 (1952).
The damage section of the Copyright Act was enacted to serve
a dual purpose: to provide an effective remedy for a copyright owner
who could not prove the actual amount of his damage 3 and to com32 It is interesting, however, to note that the dissenters nevertheless concurred with their brothers on the bench in maintaining that arbitration was not
a suit within the meaning of the policy, though it would be an "actual trial"
if judgment were entered on the award.
1 Any person infringing a copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws shall be liable:
(b) "To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright
proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits
which the infringer shall have made from such infringement . . . or in lieu
of actual damages and profits, such damages as to the court shall appear to be
just [damages for certain cases are specified] and such damages shall in no
other case exceed the sum of $5,000 nor be less than the sum of $250, and
shall not be regarded as a penalty." 35 STAT. 1081 (1909), as amended, 17
U. S. C. § 101 (Supp. 1952). None of the amendments to the original Act of
1909 have been material to the problems discussed in the article. All cases
cited under this Act have been decided under the same provisions of the statute.
2 193 F. 2d 162 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. granted, 343 U. S. 963 (1952).
3 Unless he proved specific damages, an injured copyright owner could
recover only nominal damages at common law. See Douglas v. Cunningham,
294 U. S. 207, 209 (1935).

